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Abstract.  In this paper we develop a process modeling framework for the evaluation and formal 
validation of Panama Canal system operations. Component- and architecture-level processes are 
organized into a three level hierarchy and modeled in LTSA. Safety and progress requirements 
are formally expressed as processes that can be evaluated through compositional and search 
processes, respectively. 
Introduction 
 
Problem  Statement.  The  Panama  Canal  is  one  of  the  world’s  most  important  waterways.  
Initially opened for operation in 1914, the canal is now in the midst of a US $5 billon upgrade 
from industrial- to information-age capability (Panama Canal Upgrade, 2007).  From a functional 
perspective,  the  new  canal  system  will  be  capable  of  servicing  a  larger  number  of  vessels, 
handling larger ships than before (i.e., so-called post-Panamax ships) and will even provide for 
continued  operations  while  sections  of  the  canal  system  are  undergoing  maintenance.  It  is 
estimated that by 2010, post-Panamax ships will have 50 percent of the world’s capacity for 
moving  containers  (Maxing  Out,  2007).  From  a  performance  perspective,  the  present-day 
Panama  Canal  is  typical  of  many  large-scale  waterways,  where  operations  (e.g.,  shipping 
throughput; avoiding accidents) are limited by an ability to: (1) sense relevant activities and 
event in the surrounding environment, (2) look  ahead and anticipate  events, and (3) control 
system  behavior.    In  an  effort  to  relax,  or  even  remove,  these  constraints,  next-generation 
waterway  systems  are  incorporating  advances  in  computing,  sensing,  and  communications.  
Sensors  gather  data  which  is  fed  to  computers  for  advanced  processing.    The  enriched 
information  leads  to  better  decision  making  which  in  turn  is  fed  back  to  automated  control 
systems.  Through this process, the aforementioned barriers are overcome, thereby providing the 
desired results.   
 
The  first  important  consequence  of  this  trend  is  that  over  time,  present-day  reliance  on 
centralized  management  of  canal  operations  will  be  replaced  by  canal  operations  that  are 
partially or fully decentralized. From a systems engineering perspective, this means that present-
day canal systems that may have only a small number of current behaviors will be replaced by 
system  architectures  having  many  concurrent  behaviors.  A  second  consequence  is  that 
automation  will  replace  some  canal  operations  currently  handled  by  humans.  Design  for 
automation in large-scale system operations is challenging because in addition to making sure 
system performance is adequate, we also need to validate that the automation system is capable  
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and will do the right thing in the first place. Lessons learned from industry (Jackson 2006; 
Magee  2006,  Sangiovanni-Vincentelli  1996)  indicate  that  there  are  now  many  automated 
engineering  systems  with  complexity  approaching  the  point  where  validation  of  design 
correctness  will  be  impossible  without  mechanisms  for  verification  are  built  into  the  design 
process itself. These mechanism include (Sangiovanni-Vincentelli 2000): 
 
•  Formal Models. We need ways to capture the design representation and it specification in an 
unambiguous ``formal language'' that has precise semantics. 
•  Abstraction.  Abstraction  mechanisms  eliminate  details  that  are  of  no  importance  when 
evaluating system performance and/or checking that a design satisfies a particular property. 
•  Decomposition.  Decomposition  is  the  process  of  breaking  a  design  at  a  given  level  of 
hierarchy  into  subsystems  and  components  that  can  be  designed  and  verified  almost 
independently. 
 
The hypothesis of our work is that these challenges can be kept in check through approaches to 
design that apply these mechanisms in a disciplined manner.  Accordingly, the purposes of this 
paper are to explain how: (1) Architecture-level models of canal behavior can be systematically 
assembled from component-level behaviors, (2) Design requirements for safety and liveliness 
can  be  expressed  formally  and  finite  state  processes,  and  (3)  Safety  validation  can  be 
accomplished  through  composition  of  finite  state  process  models  for  canal  behaviors  and 
requirements.  These  principles  are  illustrated  through  simplified  process  models  of  Panama 
Canal behavior constructed in the labeled transition system analyzer (LTSA 2007). 
 
Model-Based Design and Verification/Validation. In established approaches to system design, 
and  as  illustrated  along  the  left-hand  side  of  Figure  1,  present-day  procedures  for  “system 
testing” are executed toward the end of system development. The well-known shortcoming of 
this approach is the excessive cost of fixing errors. 
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Figure 1. Pathways of Traditional and Model-based System Development (Adapted from 
Sidorova (Sidorova 2007)   3 
 
Emerging approaches to system design (Magee 2006, Sidorova 2007, Uchitel 2004) are based 
upon formal methods and selective use of design abstractions. The new approach benefits system 
design in two ways: (1) Concepts and notations from mathematics can provide methodological 
assistance, facilitating the communication of ideas and the thinking process, and (2) Formal 
methods  allow  us  to  calculate  some  properties  of  a  design.  by  building  design  logic  into 
requirements  and  using  formal models  for  synthesis  of  architecture-level  representations.  As 
illustrated along the right-hand side of Figure 1, the goal is to move design processes forward to 
the  point  where  early  detection  of  errors  is  possible  and  system  operations  are  correct-by-
construction (Sidorova 2007).  
Process Modeling and Validation with LTSA 
 
       The labeled transition system analyzer (LTSA) is a tool for validating communication and 
sequencing among entities in systems containing concurrent behaviors (LTSA 2007). In LTSA, 
processes  correspond  to  sequences  of  actions.  Spatial  and  temporal  design  concerns  are  not 
captured  in  LTSA  (i.e.,  they  are  abstracted  from  modeling  consideration).  The  textual 
representation is the finite state process (FSP) language. Labeled transition systems (LTSs) are 
the graphical representation.  
 
From Requirements to Behavior with LTSA.  The transformation from requirements to high-
level  design  occurs  with  the  following  activities:  (1)  identify  main  events,  actions  and 
interactions, (2) identify main processes, (3) identify and define properties of interest, and (4) 
structure processes into an architecture. Each canal component or subsystem will have behavior 
that can be defined by a finite state machine. Therefore, architecture-level models of behavior 
will  be  viewed  as  a  network  of  interacting  finite  state  machine  processes.  A  top-down 
specification of required behavior for components can be specified through the use of visual 
modeling languages such as UML. Models of architecture-level behavior (details given below) 
are synthesized through a bottom-up composition of component-level behaviors. 
 
Specification  of  Component-  and  Architecture-Level  Behavior.  Process  modeling  of 
component-level behavior can be specified directly through FSP code. If concurrent behaviors 
have  common  elements,  then  there  will  be  an  interleaving  of  behaviors  linked  at  common 
actions. Models of architecture-level behavior are obtained through the parallel composition of 
concurrent processes at the component level. Given two labeled transition systems (LTSs), let’s 
say P1 and P2 we denote the parallel composition P1 || P2 as the LTS that models their joint 
behavior. By extension, the architectural-level behavior model is defined by the product: P1 || P2 
|| ….. || PN, where Pi is the finite state model  for the i-th component among N interacting 
components.    Joint  behavior  is  the  result  of  all  LTSs  executing  asynchronously,  but 
synchronizing on all shared message labels. At  the component level, the nodes of a labeled 
transition system represent states the component can be in. At the architecture level, labeled 
transition  system  nodes  represent  system-level  states,  which,  in  turn,  correspond  to  specific 
combinations of component-level states. Transitions are labeled with messages that components 
send to each other. 
 
Validation of Requirements. The properties required of the system are also modeled as state  
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machines. LTSA mechanically checks that the specification of a concurrent system satisfies the 
properties required of its behavior. A good system: (1) exhibits safety and liveliness, and (2) 
avoids  deadlocks.  A  safety  property  asserts  that  nothing  bad  will  happen  during  the  system 
execution. A liveliness property asserts that something good eventually happens (e.g., suppose 
that ships are approaching the Panama Canal. Liveliness would assert that, eventually, all of 
them will be able to pass through the passageway safely). A system state is deadlocked when 
there are no eligible actions that a system can perform. 
 
Formal model checking procedures make sure that the architecture-level design: (1) does what it 
is supposed to do; (2) prevents certain behaviors from occurring; and (3) does not support un-
intended behaviors. If any one of these aspects is violated, then we have a gap between the 
intended system and the actual system design. The resulting high-level design is much more 
abstract than a detailed software/hardware implementation. But it captures the key patterns of 
interaction  and  can  be  formally  analyzed  for  safety  and  liveliness  properties.  A  detailed 
software/hardware implementation and optimization follows design.  
 
Building the Panama Canal Process Model 
 
The Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is an 80 kilometer passageway that joins the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans. See Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Plan and Elevation View of the Panama Canal. 
 
A ship passing through the canal will ascend through a set of locks, traverse Lake Gatun, and 
then descend through the lock system on the other side. The lock systems consist of a set of lock 
compartments having entrance and exit gates. 
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The locks function as water lifts, raising ships from sea level to the elevation of Lake Gatun (26 
meters above sea level). The lock chambers are 33.53 meters wide and 304.8 meters long. The 
maximum dimensions of a ship that can transit the canal are: 32.3 meters in the beam, 12 meters 
draft, and 294 meters long. The water used to raise and lower the vessels in each set of locks 
comes from Lake Gatun by gravity.  
 
Basic Ship Behavior. As a ship approaches the first chamber, valves below the compartment are 
released and the water level adjusts to that outside of the canal. The gates then open and the ship 
moves into the first chamber. After the gates lock, valves of the first and second chamber are 
opened to allow the water level of the first chamber to rise and match the second chamber. The 
gates open for a second time, allowing the ship to move into the second chamber. This repetitive 
process continues until the ship reaches the Lake Gatun. The ship traverses the lake and then 
descends through the exit lock system. The basic ship behavior is identical for crossings Pacific 
to Atlantic and Atlantic to Pacific. 
 
Component-Level Processes 
 
        Figures 3 and 4 show elevation view of a double lock system architecture, the component-
level processes, and labeled transition system (LTS) representations for sequences of actions 
representing basic component level behavior.  
 
 
Figure 3. Elevation View of Lock System Components, Component- and Subsystem-Level 
Processes. 
 
The lock system architecture is an assemblage of Gate, Pump, and Ship processes. Gates can 
open and close, and Pumps can adjust the water level ``up’’ and ``down’’ (i.e., release). In the 
present-day canal, adjustments to water level are achieved through gravity feed from lake Gatun. 
The modified Panama Canal will rely on mechanical pumps and water saving basins. In LTSA, 
these actions are specified in FSP by writing: 
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GATE = ( opengate->closegate->GATE). 
PUMP = ( pumpup -> pumpdown->PUMP). 
 
The equivalent graphical format is shown along the right-hand side of Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Basic Component-Level Process Models for Gates, Pumps and a Ship Climbing 
Through a Double Lockset. 
 
Ship behavior is similarly defined in terms of sequences of actions that need to occur in order for 
the vessel to ascend/descend through the double lock system, i.e., 
 
SHIP = ( arrive -> request-> acquire -> enterlock1 -> enterlock2 -> exitlock2 -> clear-> SHIP). 
 
The actions arrive,  enterlock1 and enterlock2 define ship movement. The actions request, 
acquire and clear involve communication, either with the lock passage controller for scheduler 
(details can be found below). LTSA requires that processes be continuously operating – hence, in 
the process model,  after a ship clears the canal it immediately returns to the beginning. 
Composition of Component-Level Processes 
 
With definitions for basic component-level processes in place, LTSA provides support for 
replication of component processes and definition of  subsystem-level processes through tagging 
and composition. For example, the fragment of code: 
 
   ||SHIP_PROG = ( atlantic:SHIP || pacific:SHIP)   7 
   ||CONVOY = ([1..2]:SHIP_PROG). 
 
creates tags for ships on the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the canal, and then a convoy of ships on 
each side. At  this point, the individual ships have completely independent behavior. Additional 
program structure can be enforced by creating queue processes and constraining the behavior to 
follow  a  first-in/first-out  policy.    Similarly,  unconstrained  behavior  of  the  lock  system 
components in achieve through composition of the pump and gate processes, e.g., 
 
 ||DOUBLEGATE = ( low:PUMP || high:PUMP || low:GATE || middle:GATE || high:GATE). 
 
creates a lockset with three gates (tagged, low, middle, and high) and two pumps (tagged low 
and  high).    The  DOUBLEGATE  process  model  has  32  states  representing  all  possible 
permutation of pump and gates states. It is important to note that our use of tagged names simply 
relate processes to their position in the lockset system and are decoupled from spatial concerns 
(e.g., which lockset is on the West or East side of the Panama Canal). Hence, it is possible to 
systematically assemble a complete lockset process model, which in turn can act as a template or 
module for assembly of  behavior for  arbitrary canal configurations. 
High-Level Canal Operations 
 
By  themselves,  the  pumps,  gates  and  ships  are  independent  processes  that  accomplish 
repetitive  low-level  operations.  System-level  behavior  of  the  ship  convoys,  coupled  with 
coordination of actions in the lock system is controlled via a high-level scheduler process and 
passage controllers for each of the double lock systems. 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic for Assembly of Process Components in Lock Control.  
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Figure 5 shows the essential details of communication among the scheduler, passage control, 
canal system (pumps and gates), and ship passage processes. When a ship ‘’arrives’’ at either the 
Atlantic or Pacific canal entrances, it request permission to enter the first lock system. If the lock 
system is currently occupied then the scheduler will direct the ship to join a queue. Eventually 
the ship will acquire access to the lock set, and be guided through the ascend/descend operations 
by the passage controller process (i.e., enterlock1, enterlock2,  exitlock2, clear). 
 
Constraints  on  passage  control  ensure  that  the  sequencing  of  ship  actions  is  consistent  with 
physical constraints. For example, if a ship enters the Panama Canal from the Atlantic side, then 
it  needs  to  completely  traverse  the  Atlantic-side  lockset  for  before  entering  and  descending 
through the Pacific-side lockset. These constraints can be enforced through sequences of actions 
that define entry and exit from specific locksets, e.g., the process 
 
   EASTNOPASSLOCK = (atlantic.arrive -> atlantic.clear -> pacific.arrive -> 
                    pacific.clear -> EASTNOPASSLOCK). 
 
preserves order of operations for a ship traversing the canal, East to West. 
Full Canal Model 
 
       The full canal model is defined through a system-level composition of  Pacific- and Atlantic-
side systems together with the process model for ship convoy behavior. In turn, the Pacific- and 
Atlantic-side  processes  are  a  composition  of  DOUBLEGATE,    PASSSAGECONTROL  and 
SCHEDULER  processes.  Joint  behaviors  in  the  full  canal  model  correspond  to  sequenced 
actions/interactions between lower-level processes – these actions reduce the size of the overall 
model.  Still,  models  are  very  large,  often  exceeding  140,000  different  states  (i.e.,  distinct 
combinations of subsystem and component-level states).  
 
       With  small  process  models  (e.g.,  containing  less  than  20-30  states),  one  can  visualize 
communication between the states in LTSA. Since this approach is intractable for analysis of full 
canal systems, we must resort to mathematics to formally validate properties of the full canal 
process model. 
 
Formal Validation of Panama Canal Operations 
 
In  our  approach  to  process  modeling  and  formal  validation,  requirements  are  written  as 
properties that can be formally evaluated with respect to the component- and architecture-level 
models. A property is an attribute of a process that is true for every possible execution of that 
process. Properties of interest for current processes fall into two categories: safety and liveliness. 
We also need to check that the proposed system will not enter a deadlock state – that is, a state 
for which there is no exit (or outgoing transition) , and hence the system becomes blocked and 
cannot make further progress.   9 
Safety of Canal Operations 
 
A safety property asserts that nothing bad happens during the canal operation. For Panama 
Canal operations we need to ensure that at all times: (1) The canal scheduler will not assign more 
than one ship to a lock; (2) Ships acquire a lock before clearing it; (3) West-bound ships will 
clear the Atlantic lockset before the Pacific lockset (and vice versa for East-bound ships); and (4) 
Floods will be prevents by ensuring that a gate will not open before water levels on both side of 
the gate are equalized. 
 
Safety properties are specified in FSP by property processes. Safety checks are compositional 
in the sense that if there is no violation at a subsystem level, then there cannot be a violation 
when that subsystem is composed with other subsystems.  For example, the abbreviated fragment 
of code: 
 
property  SYS_FLOOD  =  (  ascend->low.opengate->low.closegate->low.pumpup->RESET                                 
| resethigh->low.pumpup->low.pumpdown …. low.closegate-> SYS_FLOOD ), 
RESET= ( resetlow->low.pumpdown->low.opengate->low.closegate->low.pumpup->RESET        
| descend->low.pumpdown->…. low.closegate->SYS_FLOOD). 
 
Establishes a property SYS_FLOOD that asserts the lower locks will not flood. 
 
 
Figure 6: Abbreviated LTS Diagram for atlantic:SYS_FLOOD Safety Property. 
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By  default,  and  as  illustrated  in  Figure  6,  the  LTSA  compiler  will  automatically  generate 
transitions to the  error state. In total the atlantic:SYS_FLOOD property process contains 17 
states, 16 for the process specification, and one for the error state.  
      Two outcomes are possible when the flood property processes are composed with the system 
specification, i.e., 
 
||FULLCANAL_TEST = (FULLCANAL || pacific:SYS_FLOOD || atlantic:SYS_FLOOD). 
 
If the combined canal–property process does not contain an error, then the FULLCANAL_TEST 
specification will remain unchanged. If on the other hand, there is an error in the architecture-
level design, indicating the possibility of an accidental flood occurring, then this will show up 
through the presence of an error state in FULLCANAL_TEST. 
Liveliness of Canal Operations  
 
A liveliness property asserts that something good eventually happens. For the Panama Canal 
application we need to ensure that all ships will eventually clear the system. Accordingly the 
statement pair: 
 
progress EASTPASS = {east.[1..2].atlantic.clear}         
progress WESTPASS = {west.[1..2].pacific.clear}     
 
asserts that all east-bound ships will eventually clear the Atlantic lockset and, conversely, all  
west-bound ships will eventually clear the Pacific lockset. It is important to note that unlike 
safety properties, liveliness (or progress) checks are not compositional. Instead, progress analysis 
involves the systematic construction of terminal sets. A progress violation occurs if one or more 
terminal sets does not contain at least one of the terminal set actions (i.e., east[1].atlantic.clear or 
east[2].atlantic.clear for east-bound ships). 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
The  essential  details  of  a  process  modeling  framework  for  the  formal  evaluation  and 
validation of Panama Canal System operations has been presented in this paper. The importance 
of  this  work  stems  from  the  critical  role  that  the  Panama  Canal  plays  in  global  shipping 
operations. Motivation for this work stems from the difficulty engineers have in evaluating and 
validating  designs  where  behavior  is  defined  by  decentralized  operations  (many  concurrent 
behaviors),  yet  automation  (sensors,  control,  computer  software)  is  needed  for  the 
implementation  of  correct  working  operations.  The  enablers  for  our  work  are  finite  state 
processes and the labeled transition analyzer (LTSA). LTSA has its roots in the analysis of  
computer  operating  system  processes.  Yet,  as  we  have  shown  in  this  paper,  fundamental 
properties for design can be easily reinterpreted and placed in a canal design setting. 
Figure 7 shows process hierarchies for lockset and sensor-enabled lockset control. In this 
paper we have restricted discussion to lockset control (i.e., we have described scheduler, passage 
control, ship control, ship, gate and pump processes). Processes have been organized into three    11 
 
 
Figure 7. Process Hierarchies for Lockset and Sensor-Enabled Lockset Control. 
 
 
levels:  system  level  command,  lockset  level  procedures,  and  component  level  mechanisms. 
Although we have talked about the need for sensor-enabled control, the lockset model does not 
explicitly  contain  sensor  processes.  Furthermore,  because  LTSA  requires  that  processes  be 
continuous processes, ship behaviors are modeled as repetitive cycles of actions – although there 
is nothing wrong with this assumption, in terms of validating lockset and canal behaviors, in 
practice  ships  don’t  have  this  behavior.  This  modeling  assumption  also  limits  the  size  of 
problems that can be studied. Although we were able to model full canal system models having 
more than 100,000 states, by simply adding more ships to the system, the model will grow to a 
point where even a modern PC/laptop cannot handle the memory requested by LTSA. We are 
currently exploring a second model where locksets are modeled with sensors to detect the arrival 
of ships, monitor water levels, and ensure locks are restricted to single use operations. This 
data/information will be relayed to the sensor-enabled scheduler, which in course, will direct the 
passage controller to provide access to ships at the front of the low-lock and high-lock queues. 
An important benefit of this approach is that ships do not need to be modeled as processes –  
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instead, they are simply viewed as objects that are directed to pass through the canal system.  
Results of this work along with complete details of the LTSA analyses will be released in an ISR 
Technical Report (Johnson and Austin, 2007). 
        Future work will focus on development of methods to keep problem sizes in check through: 
(1) judicious use of abstractions, and (2) layered organization and evaluation of property models.  
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